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Abstract—Due to the publicly-known deterministic character-
istic of pilot tones, pilot-aware attack, by jamming, nulling
and spoofing pilot tones, can significantly paralyze the uplink
channel training in large-scale MISO-OFDM systems. To solve
this, we in this paper develop an independence-checking coding
based (ICCB) uplink training architecture for one-ring scattering
scenarios allowing for uniform linear arrays (ULA) deployment.
Here, we not only insert randomized pilots on subcarriers for
channel impulse response (CIR) estimation, but also diversify
and encode subcarrier activation patterns (SAPs) to convey those
pilots simultaneously. The coded SAPs, though interfered by
arbitrary unknown SAPs in wireless environment, are qualified
to be reliably identified and decoded into the original pilots by
checking the hidden channel independence existing in subcarri-
ers. Specifically, an independence-checking coding (ICC) theory
is formulated to support the encoding/decoding process in this
architecture. The optimal ICC code is further developed for
guaranteeing a well-imposed estimation of CIR while maximizing
the code rate. Based on this code, the identification error
probability (IEP) is characterized to evaluate the reliability of
this architecture. Interestingly, we discover the principle of IEP
reduction by exploiting the array spatial correlation, and prove
that zero-IEP, i.e., perfect reliability, can be guaranteed under
continuously-distributed mean angle of arrival (AoA). Besides
this, a novel closed form of IEP expression is derived in discretely-
distributed case. Simulation results finally verify the effectiveness
of the proposed architecture.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, pilot-aware attack,
OFDM, channel estimation, independence-checking coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security paradigms in wireless communications has at-
tracted increasing attention with the evolution of air interface
technology towards the requirements of future 5G networks.
In those envisioned scenarios, multiple existing technologies,
such as orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM),
are closely integrated with novel innovative attempts, such
as large-scale multiple-antenna technique or namely massive
multiple-input, multiple-output (Massive MIMO) [1]. And
the phenomenon accompanied by is that the imperishable
characteristic of wireless channels, such as the open and
shared nature, have always been rendering those air interface
technologies vulnerable to growing security attacks, including
the denial of service (DoS) attacks and tampering attacks,
among others. As a major manner of DoS attack, jamming
attacks, in a variety of behaviors out of control, have exhibited
its astonishing destructive power on those existing [2] and
emerging air interface techniques [3].
A very typical example is that OFDM systems under large-
scale antenna arrays are very suspectable to the protocol-aware
attack, a well-directed attack that can sense the specific pro-
tocols and intensify the effectiveness of attack by jamming a
physical layer mechanism instead of data payload directly. As
a typical protocol-aware attack, pilot-aware attack could hinder
the regular channel training between legitimate transceiver
pair. This is done, in theory, by jamming/nulling/spoofing the
deterministic pilot tones which are known and shared on the
time-frequency resource grid (TFRG) by all parties for channel
acquisition [4]–[6]. That is to say, pilot-aware attack could
embrace three flexible modes, i.e., pilot tone jamming (PTJ)
attack [5], pilot tone nulling (PTN) attack [5] and pilot tone
spoofing (PTS) attack [6]. As an example of PTS attack in
narrow-band single-carrier systems, pilot contamination (PC)
attack was first introduced and analysed by [7]. Following [7],
many research have been investigated on the advantage of
large-scale multi-antenna arrays on defending against PC
attack [8]–[10]. However, those studies were limited to the
attack detection by exploiting the physical layer information,
such as auxiliary training or data sequences [8], [9] and some
prior-known channel information [10].
The first attempt to resolve pilot aware attack was pro-
posed for a conventional OFDM systems in [11], that is,
transforming the PTN and PTS attack into PTJ attack by
randomizing the locations and values of regular pilot tones
on TFRG. Assuming the independent subcarriers, authors
in [6] proposed a frequency-domain subcarrier (FS) channel
estimation framework under the PTS attack by exploiting pilot
randomization and independence component analysis (ICA).
One key problem is that the practical subcarriers are not
mutually independent in the scenarios with limited channel
taps, and thus ICA does not apply in this case. What’s most
important is that the influence of SAPs on CIR estimation
was not evaluated. Actually, when the so-called optimal code
is adopted, its CIR estimation is extremely ill-imposed and
unprecise.
This further motives us to provide a secure large-scale multi-
antenna OFDM systems, with some necessary consideration,
2i.e., array spatial correlation, and redesign the overall pilot
sharing process during the uplink channel training phase.
Most importantly, we have to redesign the supporting CIR
estimation process. Before that, we have to admit that the
pilot randomization technique, though necessary for resolving
pilot-aware attack, brings to the process two bottlenecks,
i.e., unpredictable attack modes and non-recoverable pilot
information covered by random wireless channels. Basically,
an efficient hybrid attack is more likely to be the following:
Problem 1 (Attack Model). An attacker in hybrid attack
mode can choose either PTJ mode or silence cheating (SC)
mode for intentional information hiding as well.
Two notes should be noticed, that is, 1) an attacker in
PTJ mode could choose two behaviors, i. e., wide-band pilot
jamming (WB-PJ) attack and partial-band pilot jamming (PB-
PJ) attack. 2) the attacker in SC mode turns to keep silent for
cheating the legitimate node. In this case, though the legitimate
node adopts random pilots by supposing the attacker exists, the
attacker actually does not pay the price since it does not jam
at all.
On the other hand, we could further identify the second
bottleneck as follows:
Problem 2. Randomized pilots, if utilized for uplink channel
training through wireless channels, cannot be separated, let
alone identified.
This issue refers to three fundamental concepts which are
respectively recognized as pilot conveying, separation and
identification in this paper. Here, the innovative methodology
we introduce is: Selectively activate and deactivate the OFDM
subcar- riers and create various SAP candidates. Diversify
SAPs to encode pilots and reuse those coded subcarriers
carrying pilot information, to estimate the uplink channels
simultaneously. In what follows, the main contributions of this
paper are summarized:
1) First, a deterministic and precise encoding principle is
established such that arbitrary SAPs can be encoded as a
binary code. The ICC theory is then developed to further
optimize the code such that arbitrary two codewords
in the code, if being superimposed on each other, can
be separated and identified reliably. Furthermore, an
optimal ICC codebook is formulated with the maximum
code rate while guaranteeing a well-imposed CIR es-
timation. Based on this code, a reliable ICCB uplink
training architecture is finally built up by constructing
an one-to-one mapping/demapping relationship between
pilots, codewords and SAPs.
2) We further characterize the reliability of this architecture
as the identification error probability (IEP) and discover
a hidden phenomenon that when subcarrier estimations
are performed on the basis of this architecture, the array
spatial correlation existing in the subcarriers overlapped
from the legitimate node and the attacker can further
reduce IEP. At this point, the attacker can actually help
the legitimate node to improve the reliability. Interest-
ingly, it can also be proved that zero IEP cannot be
achieved only when the attacker is located in the clusters
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Fig. 1. Diagram of large-scale MISO-OFDM system under the wide-band
one-ring scattering model. In this system, AoA ranges of Bob and Ava overlap,
which incurs an effective pilot-aware attack on the uplink channel estimation.
with the same mean AoA as the legitimate node. This
principle, in theory, could facilitate the acquisition of
the position of Ava. If we consider the mean AoA
with continuous distribution, the reliability, in this sense,
can be perfectly guaranteed. Otherwise, for a practical
discrete distribution model, we again show how much
the reliability could be further reinforced.
The rest of the paper is summarized as follows. In section II,
we present an overview of pilot-aware attack on multi-antenna
OFDM systems. In Section III, we introduce an ICCB uplink
training architecture. Channel estimation and identification
enhancement is described in Section IV. Numerical results are
presented in Section V and finally we conclude our work in
Section VI.
II. OVERVIEW OF PILOT-AWARE ATTACK ON
MULTI-ANTENNA OFDM SYSTEMS
In this section, we will provide a basic overview of pilot-
aware attack by introducing three basic configurations, in-
cluding the system and signal model as well as the channel
estimation model. Under this background, we will then review
the influence of a common-sense technique, i.e., pilot random-
ization, on the pilot-aware attack and identify the existing key
impediments.
A. System Description
We consider an synchronous large-scale MISO-OFDM sys-
tem with a NT ≫ 1-antenna base station (named as Alice) and
a single-antenna legitimate user (named as Bob). As shown in
Fig. 1, the based station (BS) with angle spread ∆ is equipped
with a Dλ-spacing directive ULA and placed at the origin
along the y-axis to serve a 120-degree sector that is centered
around the x-axis (α = 0). We assume that no energy is
received for angles α /∈ [−pi3 , pi3 ]. Furthermore, we consider
the wide-band one-ring scattering model for which Bob is
surrounded by local scatterers within [θ1 −∆, θ1 +∆] [12],
3[13]. Here θ1 represents the mean AoA of clusters surrounding
Bob.
In this system, pilot-tone based uplink channel training pro-
cess is considered in which N available subcarriers indexed by
Ψ are provided during each available OFDM symbol time. In
principle, NB subcarriers indexed by ΨB= {i0, i1, . . . , iNB−1}
are employed for pilot tone insertion and the following
channel estimation. A single-antenna malicious node (named
as Ava) then aims to disturb this training process by jam-
ming/spoofing/nulling those pilot tones. We denote the set
of victim subcarriers by ΨA= {i0, i1, . . . , iNA−1} where NA
denotes the number of victim subcarriers. Furthermore, we
make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Ava is surrounded by local scatterers within
[θ2 −∆, θ2 +∆] and always has the overlapping AoA inter-
vals with Bob, this is, [θ2 −∆, θ2 +∆]∩ [θ1 −∆, θ1 +∆] 6=
∅. Here, θ2 denotes the mean AoA of clusters surrounding Ava.
This assumption is supported by the scenario where a
common large scattering body (e.g., a large building) could
create a set of angles common to all nodes in the system and
the overlapping is inevitable. The result is that the channel
covariance eigenspaces of two nodes are coupled and the
attack is hard to be eliminated through angular separation [12].
B. Receiving Signal Model
To begin with, we denote pilot tones of Bob and Ava at
the j-th subcarrier and k-th symbol time, respectively by
xjB [k], j ∈ ΨB and xjA [k], j ∈ ΨA.
Assumption 2. We in this paper assume xiB [k] = xB [k] =√
ρBe
jφk , i ∈ ΨB for low overhead consideration and the-
oretical analysis. Alternatively, we can superimpose xB [k]
onto a dedicated pilot sequence optimized under a non-
security oriented scenario. At this point, φk can be an ad-
ditional phase difference for security consideration. We do
not constraint the strategies of pilot tones of Ava such that
xiA [k] =
√
ρAe
jϕk,i , i ∈ ΨA.
Let us proceed to the basic OFDM procedure. First, the
frequency-domain pilot signals of Bob and Ava over N
subcarriers are respectively stacked asN by 1 vectors xB [k] =
[xB,j [k]]
T
j∈Ψ and xA [k] = [xA,j [k]]
T
j∈Ψ. Here there exist:
xB,j [k] =
{
xB [k] j ∈ ΨB
0 j /∈ ΨB , xA,j [k] =
{
xjA [k] j ∈ ΨA
0 j /∈ ΨA
(1)
Assume that the length of cyclic prefix is larger than L.
The parallel streams, i.e., xB [k] and xA [k], are modulated
with inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). After removing
the cyclic prefix at the i-th receive antenna and k-th OFDM
symbol time, Alice derive the time-domain N by 1 vector
yi [k] as:
yi [k] = HiC,BF
HxB [k] +H
i
C,AF
HxA [k] + v
i [k] (2)
whereHiC,B andH
i
C,A are N×N circulant matrices for which
the first column of HiC,B and H
i
C,A are respectively given
by
[
hi
T
B 01×(N−L)
]T
and
[
hi
T
A 01×(N−L)
]T
. Here,
hiB ∈ CL×1 and hiA ∈ CL×1 are CIR vectors, respectively
from Bob and Ava to the i-th receive antenna of Alice. hiA
is assumed to be independent with hiB. v
i [k] ∈ CN×1 with
vi [k] ∼ CN (0, INσ2) is the AWGN vector at the i-th antenna
and k-th symbol time Taking FFT, Alice finally derives the
frequency-domain N by 1 signal vector at the i-th receive
antenna and k-th OFDM symbol time as
y˜i [k] = diag {xB [k]}FLhiB +diag {xA [k]}FLhiA +wiN [k]
(3)
Here, there exists FL =
√
NF (:, 1 : L) where F denotes
the DFT matrix. And we have wij [k] = Fjv
i [k] where
Fj is the j-row submatrix of F. Throughout this paper, we
assume that the CIRs belonging to different paths at each
antenna exhibit spatially uncorrelated Rayleigh fading. We
denote power delay profiles (PDPs) of the l-th path of Bob
and Ava, respectively by σ2B,l, σ
2
A,l. Without loss of generality,
each path has the uniform and normalized PDP satisfying
L∑
l=1
σ2B,l = 1,
L∑
l=1
σ2A,l = 1 [14]. For each path, CIRs of
different antennas are assumed to be spatially correlated.
In one-ring scattering scenarios, the correlation between the
channel coefficients of antennas 1 ≤ m,n ≤ NT, ∀l can be
defined by [12]:
[Rk]m,n =
1
2∆
∫ ∆+θk
−∆+θk
e−j2piD(m−n) sin(θ)dθ, k = 1, 2 (4)
Here, Ri represents the channel covariance matrix of Bob if
i = 1 and Ava otherwise. R1, instead of R2, is known by
Alice.
C. Channel Estimation Model
Now let us turn to describe the estimation models of
FS channels under specific attacks. First, Ava under PTS
attack mode could learn the pilot tones employed by Bob
in advance and impersonate Bob by utilizing the same pilot
tone learned. In this case, there exists ΨB ∪ ΨA = ΨB and
xiA [k] = xB [k] , i ∈ ΨB. Signals in Eq. (3) can be rewritten
as:
y˜iPTS [k] = FLh
i
BxB [k] + FLh
i
AxB [k] +w
i
N [k] (5)
Finally, a least square (LS) based channel estimation is
formulated by: ĥicon = h
i
B+h
i
A+(FL)
+ xHB [k]
|xHB[k]|2w
i
N [k] where
(FL)
+
is the MoorePenrose pseudo-inverse of FL. We see that
the estimation of hiB is contaminated by h
i
A with a noise bias
when a PTS attack happens.
As to PTN attack, we emphasize the difference lying in
the fact that there exists diag {xA [k]}=Σ⊙ xA [k] such that
ΣFLh
i
AxA [k] = −FLhiBxB [k]. Obviously, Ava can derive a
unique solution of the diagonal matrix Σ because the assumed
Ava can get both hiB and h
i
A (a very strong assumption
in [5]). In this case, the received signals can be rewritten
as y˜iPTN [k] = w
i
N [k]. We see that the received signals are
completely random noises, which can be seen as the worst
destruction.
In order to represent the case where PTJ attack happens,
we configure the matrix Σ with random input values. The
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Fig. 2. Diagram of ICCB uplink channel training procedures.
estimated channels are with the similar form as those in PTS
attack. The difference is that unlike PTS attack, the estimated
channels cannot benefit both Bob and Ava, which is least
efficient.
D. Influence of Pilot Randomization on Pilot-Aware Attack
To defend against pilot-aware attack, the commonsense is
that Bob shall randomize its own pilot tones. In practice,
the randomization of pilot tone values is employed. More
specifically, each of the candidate pilot phases is mapped into
a unique quantized samples, chosen from the set A, defined by
C = {φ : φ = 2mpi/C, 0 ≤ m ≤ C − 1} where C reflects the
quantization resolution. This type of pilot randomization, due
to the constraint of discrete phase samples, practically could
not prevent a hybrid attack from happening but serves as a
prerequisite for defending against pilot aware attack.
In what follows, we make the following assumption for Bob
for the sake of theoretical analysis:
Assumption 3. During two adjacent OFDM symbol time, such
as, ki, ki+1, i ≥ 0, two pilot phases φki and φki+1 are kept
with fixed phase difference, that is, φki+1 − φki = φ. Here,
φki+1 and φki are both random but φ are deterministic and
publicly known.
Institutively, how the value C increases affects the perfor-
mance of anti-attack technique. However, things seem not to
be simple as we think. As discussed in the Introduction part,
a fact is that randomized pilots, if utilized for uplink channel
training through wireless channels, cannot be separated, let
alone identified.
III. ICCB UPLINK TRAINING ARCHITECTURE
In view of above issues, we in this section aim to construct
a novel pilot sharing mechanism, logically including three key
procedures, i.e., pilot conveying, pilot separation and pilot
identification. Each procedure can be found in Algorithm 1
and Fig. 2.
A. Pilot Conveying via Binary Code on Code-Frequency Do-
main
1) Binary Code: The Eq. (40) in [15] provides a decision
threshold function γ
∆
= f (NT, Pf ), for measuring how many
antennas on one subcarrier are required to achieve a certain
probability Pf of false alarm. Here we consider three symbol
time and a 3×NT receiving signal matrix is created for detec-
tion. Under this requirement, we try to build up a relationship
between SAPs with the common binary code. Before that, we
have the following definition:
Definition 1. One subcarrier can be precisely encoded if, for
any ε > 0, there exists a positive number γ (ε) such that, for
all γ ≥ γ (ε), Pf is smaller than ε.
We should note that f (NT, Pf ) is a monotone decreasing
function of two independent variables NT and Pf . For a
given probability constraint ε∗, we could always expect a
lower bound γ (ε∗) of possible thresholds such that γ (ε∗) =
f (NT, ε
∗) is satisfied. Under this equation, we could flexibly
configure NT and γ (ε
∗) to make ε∗ approach zero [15].
We also find that the γ that achieves zero-Pf is decreased
with the increase of antennas. Basically, this phenomenon
originates from the fact that the increased dimension makes
the eigenvalues of noise matrix to be more concentrated in
a narrow interval, which is determined by the well-known
Marcenko-Pastur Law [16].
2) Code Frequency Domain: Based on Definition 1, we can
encode the m-th subcarrier as a binary digit sm according to:
sm =
{
1 if there exist signals
0 otherwise
(6)
Meanwhile, let us denote a set of binary code vectors by S
with S = {s| sm ∈ {0, 1} , 1 ≤ m ≤ Ls} where Ls denotes
the maximum length of the code. Then, a code frequency
domain could be constructed as a set of pairs (s, b) with
s ⊂ S and 1 ≤ b ≤ NB where b is an integer representing
the subcarrier index of appearance of the code. This can be
depicted in Fig. 2.
3) Binary Codebook Matrix: On the formulated code-
frequency domain, we group the binary digits and construct
the binary code by presenting a binary codebook as follows:
Definition 2. Given a NB × C binary matrix C with each
element satisfying ci,j ∈ s ⊂ S, we denote the i-th column of
C by ci with ci =
[
c1,i · · · cNB,i
]T
. We call C a binary
codebook matrix and ci a codeword of C of length NB.
Based on this definition, we also define a superposition
principle between codewords by the following:
Definition 3. The superposition sum z = xV y (designated as
the digit-by-digit Boolean sum) of two codewords denoted by
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xNB) ⊂ C and y = (y1, y2, . . . , yNB) ⊂ C
is defined by:
zi =
{
0 if xi = yi = 0
1 otherwise
(7)
where zi denotes the i-th element of vector z.
Based on above preparations, the pilot conveying process
can be shown in Algorithm 1.
B. Pilot Separation and Identification Via ICC
The study of how to optimize the previous binary codebook
such that it can separate and identify codewords from the dis-
5Algorithm 1 Pilot Conveying, Separation and Identification
1: Pilot Conveying 1) Insert one phase that is selected from
set A, onto subcarriers at the initial OFDM symbol, for
instance defined by k0. The phases of pilot signals inserted
in adjacent OFDM symbols, such as ki, i ≥ 1 obey the
Assumption 3.
2) Construct an one-to-one mapping from the phases in
set A to codewords of binary codebook matrix derived in
Section III-A, and then further to SAPs. Select one phase,
i.e., the phase at k0, for pattern activation. The specific
principle is that pilot signals are transmitted on the i-th
subcarrier if the i-th digit of the codeword is equal to 1,
otherwise this subcarrier is kept unoccupied.
2: Pilot Separation Alice detects the available subcarriers
to acquire the superimposed SAPs using the detection
technique shown in [15]. Then Alice decodes those su-
perimposed SAPs and derives two individual codewords
by using the inner-product based differential decoding
proposed in [6].
3: Pilot Identification Separated codewords that satisfy The-
orem 1 are qualified to be identified and then demapped
into the pilot phases in A for recovering the pilot signals
of Bob.
turbed codeword is called ICC theory, including the encoding
principle and decoding principle.
1) Encoding Principle: We introduce the concept of s-
overlapping code with constant weight w by defining:
Definition 4. A NB × C binary matrix C is called a ICC-
(NB, s) code of length NB and order s, if for any column set
Q such that |Q| = 2, there exist at least a set S of s rows
such that ci,j = 1, ∀i, j, i ∈ S, j ∈ Q.
In this principle, we can know that any two codewords in
C must overlap with each other on at least s non-zero digits.
Backing to the subcarriers, s means the overlapped subcarriers
which are exploited for channel estimation. Now, we try to
establish the relationship of s with the weight w of the code
since the number of w determines the code rate.
Theorem 1. The weight of ICC-(NB, s) code of length NB
and order s satisfies w = NB+s2 with NB ≥ s. w is an integer
smaller than NB.
Proof. See proof in Appendix VII-A.
Here and in the following section, we assume the ratio of
two integers is always kept to be an integer without loss of
generality. Based on the theorem, we can derive the number
of codewords or namely the columns in C, by a binomial
coefficient C =
(
NB
NB+s
2
)
. Therefore, we have the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. The code rate of ICC-(NB, s) code, defined
by RICC =
log2(C)
NB
, is calculated as
RICC = log2
[
NB!(
NB+s
2
)
!
(
NB−s
2
)
!
]1/NB
(8)
Theorem 2. The optimal ICC-(NB, s) code maximizing the
code rate holds when s = L. In this case, the reliability
measured by IEP is given by
PI =
NB!−
(
NB+L
2
)
!
(
NB−L
2
)
!
2NB+1
(
NB+L
2
)
!
(
NB−L
2
)
!
(9)
Proof. See proof in Appendix VII-B.
2) Decoding Procedure: The related technique in this part
is same with that in Fig. 3 of [6]. We do not specify this.
The overall process can be shown in Algorithm 1.
IV. CHANNEL ESTIMATION AND IDENTIFICATION
ENHANCEMENT
In this section, we continue our design work and focus on
the channel estimation phase.
A. FS Channel Estimation
We do not consider the case where there is no attack since
in this case LS estimator is a natural choice. If looking back to
the pilot identification under a certain attack, we could derive
two results, that is, one identified Bob’s pilot vector or two
confusing pilot vectors. For better considering the two cases,
we in this section assume the identification error happens and
forget the case without error, that is, we could get two confus-
ing pilot vectors defined by xL,1=
[
xB [k0] xB [k1]
]T
and
xL,2=
[
xA [k0] xA [k1]
]T
within two OFDM symbol time,
i.e., k0 and k1. In this way, the estimator to be designed in
this case can also apply in the another case naturally.
We consider two OFDM symbol time, i.e., k0 and k1 and
s, s ≥ 1 randomly-overlapping subcarriers. The randomness
means their random positions of carrier frequency. Then the
signals received on overlapping subcarriers within k0 and k1
are stacked as the 2×NTs matrix YL, equal to
YL = XLHL +NL (10)
where XL is denoted by a 2× 2 matrix satisfying XL =[
xL,1 xL,2
]
. The integrated 2×NTs channel matrix
HL satisfies HL =
[
hTB,L h
T
A,L
]T
. Here, there exist
hB,L =
[ (
FL,sh
i
B
)T
, . . . ,
(
FL,sh
NT
B
)T ]
and hA,L =[ (
FL,sh
i
A
)T
, . . . ,
(
FL,sh
NT
A
)T ]
. FL,s is the s-row
matrix for which each index of s rows belongs to the
set Ps that is defined by Ps = {j1, . . . , js}, Ps ⊆
Ψ, |Ps| = s. NL represents the 2×NTs noise matrix with
NL =
[
wTL [k0] w
T
L [k1]
]T
where there exists wL [k] =[
w1
T
s [k] , . . . , w
NT
T
s [k]
]
for k = k0, k1.
Now we turn to the procedure of channel estimation.
First, xL,1 and xL,2, are deemed as the candidate weight
vectors for estimating. We then consider the sample covari-
ance matrix given by CYL =
1
NTs
YLY
H
L and finally de-
rive the asymptotically-optimal linear minimum mean square
error (LMMSE) estimators as WB,L = TBx
H
L,1C
−1
YL
and
WA,L = TAx
H
L,2C
−1
YL
, where TB
∆
=
Tr(RB,L)Tr(RF)
NTs
and TA
∆
=
6Tr(RA,L)Tr(RF)
NTq
. Here, there exists Tr (RB,L) = Tr (RA,L) =
NT and therefore we could define TB = TA = T .
The estimated versions of FS channels are respectively
derived as
ĥB,L=WB,LYL, ĥA,L=WA,LYL (11)
The normalized mean square error (NMSE) for the two estima-
tions are respectively defined by ε2B =
E
{‖ĥB,L−hB,L‖2}
NTs
, ε2A =
E
{‖ĥA,L−hA,L‖2}
NTs
Furthermore, the relationship between the
ideal channels with estimated versions can be given by
hB,L = ĥB,L + εBh and hA,L = ĥA,L + εAh
′
where εBh is
uncorrelated with hB,L and εAh
′
is uncorrelated with hA,L.
Here, the entries of h and h
′
are i.i.d zero-mean complex
Gaussian vectors with each element having unity variance.
Based on above results, we could have the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 2. With the large-scale antenna array, there exists
ε2B = ε
2
A at high SNR .
Proof: See proof in Appendix VII-C
B. Identification Enhancement
Identification enhancement in this section means reducing
IEP further. Since Bob could get two confusing pilots and two
confusing estimated channels, we model the process of iden-
tification enhancement as a decision between two hypothesis:
H0 : ĥB,L → Bob,H1 : ĥA,L → Bob (12)
For the sake of simplicity, we define the following eigenvalue
decomposition:
Ri = UiΛiU
H
i ,Λi = diag
{
λi,1 · · · λi,ρi 0 · · · 0
}
(13)
Ri = UiΛiU
H
i ,Λi = diag
{
λ−1i,1 · · · λ−1i,ρi 0 · · · 0
}
(14)
RF = VfΣfV
H
f ,Σf = diag
{
λf,1 · · · λf,ρf 0 · · · 0
}
(15)
RF = VfΣfV
H
f ,Σf = diag
{
λ−1f,1 · · · λ−1f,ρf 0 · · · 0
}
(16)
where there exists RF=F
T
L,sF
∗
L,s. The rank of Ri and RF are
respectively denoted by ρi and ρf = min {s, L}. To identify
the two hypothesis, we build up the error decision function as
∆f
∆
= f
(
ĥB,L
)
− f
(
ĥA,L
)
(17)
where the function f satisfies f (r) = r
(
R1 ⊗RF
)
rH. The
function f can be simplified by the following theorem:
Theorem 3. When NT →∞, the error decision function can
be simplified as:
∆f = L
{
ρ1 − Tr
(
R2R1
)}
(18)
Proof: See proof in Appendix VII-D
Examining this equation, we could find the pilot scheduling
strategies of Ava across subcarriers do not affect the decision
function. In what follows, we try to further acquire the
characteristic of ∆f from the observation of R1 and R2.
Algorithm 2 :Channel Estimation and Identification Enhance-
ment
1: Identify whether attack happens through the codewords
derived by using inner product in [6].
2: If attack happens, calculate the sample covariance matrix
CYL =
1
NTs
YLY
H
L . Derive the two pilot signal vectors
xL,1 and xL,2. Calculate the weight matrices and finally
derive the FS channel estimations using Eq. (11). If no
attack happens, just use LS estimator to get FS channels.
3: If no attack happens, directly derive CIR estimation using
estimated FS channels, otherwise, calculate ∆f using
Eq. (17). According to Theorem 4, if ∆f > 0, ĥB,L serves
as the true estimated FS channel of Bob for further CIR
estimating, otherwise ∆f < 0, ĥA,L does. When ∆f = 0,
an identification error happens and the reliability breaks
down.
1) Hints Derived from Spatial Correlation: The au-
thors in [12] pointed out that the set of eigenval-
ues of Ri and the set of uniformly spaced samples
{Si (n/NT) : n = 0, . . . , NT − 1} are asymptotically equally
distributed, i.e., for any continuous function f (x). The
function Si (x) over x ∈
[− 12 , 12 ] satisfies: Si (x) =
1
2∆
∑
0∈[D sin(θi−∆)+x,D sin(θi+∆)+x]
1√
D2−x2 . And the channel
covariance eigenvectors Ui, i.e., NT × ρi matrix Ui, can
be approximated with a submatrix of the DFT matrix F
in the following sense: lim
NT→∞
1
NT
∥∥∥UiUHi − FSiFHSi∥∥∥2F =
0, i = 1, 2 where FSi = (fn : n ∈ JSi) with JSi =
{n, [n/NT] ∈ Si, n = 0, . . . , NT − 1} Here, Si denotes the
support of Si (x). Backing to the Eq. (18), the trace
function satisfies Tr
(
R2R1
) ≤ Tr (Λ2UH2U1Λ1) =
Tr
(
Λ2,pU
H
2U1Λ1,p
)
where Λi,p and Λi,p are respectively
defined by Λi,p = diag
{
λi,1 · · · λi,ρi
}
and Λi,p =
diag
{
λ−1i,1 · · · λ−1i,ρi
}
. As previously discussed, we ap-
proximate U
H
2U1 using F
H
S2FS1 and define S1 ∩ S2 = S3.
We then discuss the influence of S3 on Tr
(
Λ2,pU
H
2U1Λ1,p
)
.
When S3 = ∅, we can have Tr
(
R2R1
)
= 0. When S3 6= ∅,
we assume S3 = Pa and have
Tr
(
Λ2,pU
H
2U1Λ1,p
)
≤
a∑
j=1
λ2,ij
λ1,ij
(19)
This is because the eigenvectors labeled by the indexes out of
the interacted set S3 are mutually orthogonal [12]. Then we
have the following theorem:
Theorem 4. When NT →∞, there always exists
a∑
j=1
λ2,ij
λ1,ij
=
a. If θ1 6= θ2, there must exist a < ρ1 and ∆f > 0. Otherwise
if θ1 = θ2, there must exist a = ρ1 and ∆f = 0.
Proof: See proof in Appendix VII-E
2) IEP Reduction: Inspired by the above result, we know
that the identification error happens only when θ1 = θ2.
Theorem 5. Under the assumption of mean AoA obeying
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Fig. 3. Strength of ∆f versus θi, i = 1, 2 with NT = 100.
continuous probability distribution (CPD), the IEP PI in Eq.
(9) is updated to be zero. Under the assumption of mean AoA
obeying distrete probability distribution (DPD), for instance,
uniform distribution with interval length K , the IEP PI in Eq.
(9) is updated to be PI
K
.
The proof is institutive. Therefore, the IEP can be seriously
reduced and reliability is thus significantly enhanced under
hybrid attack environment. Finally, we give the overall pro-
cess of channel estimation and identification enhancement in
Algorithm 2.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we further carry out the performance evalu-
ation concerning above techniques mentioned.
In this part, we aim to verify the feasibility of Theorem
4 through simulations shown in Fig. 3 where the strength
of ∆f is plotted against θi, i = 1, 2 by configuring NT =
100 and K = 5. In this simulation, we consider that the
candidate samples of discrete mean AoAs lie within the set{−pi4 ,−pi7 , 0,−pi7 ,−pi4}. Based on the estimation in Eq. (11)
and the correlation model in Eq. (4), we derive the correspond-
ing examples of ∆f . As we can see, the identification error
happens when ∆f = 0, that is, θ1 = θ2. In this sense, we
could envision that the IEP is zero under the assumption of
the mean AoA with CPD.
For the sake of a comprehensive analysis, we consider the
DPD model for mean AoA and further simulate the IEP
performance in Fig. 4. The mean AoA is discretely and
uniformly distributed in a length-K interval. As shown in this
figure, the performance of IEP is plotted versus the length of
NB under different number L of channel taps. We consider
L to be from 7 to 13 and K to be 20. k, related to NB,
satisfies NB = 2k + 1. As we can see, even with small
subcarrier overheads, that is, NB is small, the IEP can be low
and our architecture has a very reliable performance guarantee.
Moreover, we can find that when L is low, such as L = 7,
the IEP has a maximum value after which IEP decreases with
the increase of NB. With the increase of L, IEP decreases
monotonically with NB. Furthermore, the initial value of L
determines the upper bound IEP can achieve. With the increase
of L, the upper bound decreases. For instance, the upper bound
of PI achieves as low as 10
−3.3 at k = 80 when L is equal
k
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Fig. 4. Performance of IEP versus NB under different L.
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Fig. 5. NMSE of CIR estimation versus SNR under different number of
antennas.
to 9. In this case, the number of occupied subcarriers satisfies
NB = 161.
Finally, we simulate the performance of channel estimation
in Fig. 5 in which the NMSE is plotted versus SNR of Bob
under different number of antennas. L and NB are respectively
configured to be 6 and 256. Here, we consider the estimation
shown in Eq. (11) and assume perfect identification for attacks.
We do not consider the case where there is no attack since in
this case LS estimator is a natural choice. For the simplicity
of comparison, we only present the channel estimation under
PTS attack because the estimation error floor under PTN and
PTJ attack can be easily understood to be very high. The
binned scheme proosed in [11] is simulated as an another
comparison scheme. As we can see, PTS attack, if happens,
causes a high-NMSE floor on CIR estimation for Bob. This
phenomenon can also be seen in the binned scheme. However,
the estimation in our proposed framework breaks down this
floor and its NMSE gradually decreases with the increase of
transmitting antennas. Also, we consider perfect MMSE to
be a performance benchmark for which perfect pilot tones,
including Ava’s pilot tones, are assumed to be known by
Alice. We find that the NMSE brought in our scheme gradually
approaches the level under perfect MMSE with the increase
of antennas. That’s because the estimator highly relies on
the statistical property of CYL , determined by the number
of antennas.
8VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the issue of pilot-aware attack on
the uplink channel training process in large-scale MISO-
OFDM systems. We proposed a secure ICCB uplink training
architecture in which pilot tones, usually exposed in public,
are now enabled to be shared between legitimate transceiver
pair under hybrid attack environment. We developed a novel
coding theory to support and secure this pilot sharing pro-
cess, and found an optimal code rate to finally provide the
well-imposed CIR estimation. Theoretically, we verified an
important fact that this architecture could perfectly secure pilot
sharing against the attack if the CPD model of mean AoA was
considered. In practical scenarios with DPD model of mean
AoA, this architecture could also bring a high-reliability and
high-precision CIR estimation.
VII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Since codewords in this constant-weight code are con-
strained to be with same and fixed length, the number of
overlapping digits achieves its minimum only when the zero
digits of each codeword are fully occupied. In this case,
the remanent digits, i.e., the overlapping digits, account for
2w −NB which should be equal to s and less than w.
Therefore, we can prove the theorem.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
To guarantee well-imposed CIR estimation, there should be
s ≥ L, that is, FL,s is with full column rank. However, the
increase of s will reduce the code rate since the function of C
decreases with s. Therefore, the optimal code rate is proved.
Considering the hybrid attack, we know that their exists
the possibility of 2NB codewords to appear. Two interpreted
codewords derived by inner-product operation in [6], if
satisfying the same weight constraint, will confuse Alice. In
this case, each assumption is decided with the probability
of 0.5. The possible number of codewords that satisfy this
condition is equal to NB!(NB+L
2
)
!
(
NB−L
2
)
!
. One exception is when
the codeword of Ava is identical to that of Bob. In this
case, the codeword can be uniquely determined. Finally, there
exists the possibility of NB!(NB+L
2
)
!
(
NB−L
2
)
!
− 1 codewords that
could cause identification errors. Then the ultimate IEP can
be proved.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Take Bob for example, we can derive the error of MMSE
based estimation as ε2B = T
(
1− TXHL,1C−1YLXL,1
)
.
CYL is transformed into CYL
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
1
NTs
XLRCX
H
L + σ
2I2 using asymptotic approximation [16].
Here, the 2 × 2 matrix RC satisfies RC =
diag
{
Tr (R1)Tr (RF) Tr (R2)Tr (RF)
}
. Therefore,
we can derive ε2B = T
{
1−XHL,1
(
XLX
H
L
)−1
XL,1
}
at high SNR region. In the same way, we can derive
ε2A = T
{
1−XHL,2
(
XLX
H
L
)−1
XL,2
}
. After calculating the
matrix inverse and performing matrix multiplication, we can
finally verify ε2B = ε
2
A. This completes the proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Thanks to ĥB,L = hB,L− εBh, f
(
ĥB,L
)
can be expressed
as: f
(
ĥB,L
)
= (hB,L − εBh)
(
R1 ⊗RF
)
(hB,L − εBh)H
then this equation can be expanded into f
(
ĥB,L
)
=
f1 − 2f2 + f3 where f1 = hB,L
(
R1 ⊗RF
)
hHB,L and
f2 = εBhB,L
(
R1 ⊗RF
)
h, f3 = ε
2
Bh
(
R1 ⊗RF
)
h. By
using the asymptotic approximation for each term, we
can have f
(
ĥB,L
)
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
ρ1L+ε
2
BTr
(
R1 ⊗RF
)
In
the same way, we can simplify the function f
(
ĥA,L
)
as: f
(
ĥA,L
)
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
LTr
(
R2R1
)
+ε2ATr
(
R1 ⊗RF
)
As indicated in Proposition 2, there exists ε2B = ε
2
A. By
comparing f
(
ĥB,L
)
and f
(
ĥA,L
)
, we can complete the
proof.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
First, we will prove
a∑
j=1
λ2,ij
λ1,ij
= a. As shown in [12],
the empirical CDF of eigenvalues of Ri can be asymptot-
ically approximated using the collection of samples from
{Si ([n/NT]) , n = 0, . . . , NT − 1}. Therefore, the eigenval-
ues of different individuals, if overlapping at the same location
n, can be approximated with the same eigenvalues.
Then we prove that there must a < ρ1. Examining
[θ2 −∆, θ2 +∆] and [θ1 −∆, θ2 +∆] we found if θ1 6= θ2
is satisfied, there must exist a < ρ1 since [θ2 −∆, θ2 +∆]
must have non-empty intersection with [θ1 −∆, θ1 +∆]. In
this case, the number of elements in S3 is reduced to be smaller
than that ρ1. Now we turn to the case θ1 = θ2 in which we
easily have R1 = R2 and therefore the theorem is proved.
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